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ABSTRACT
The crisis of 2008 pointed out the weaknesses of the current financial system. 
Since then, the role of central counterparties (CCP) has become increasingly im-
portant. CCPs provide guarantee, i.e., they take over the counterparty risk aris-
ing in the course of trading on different markets and guarantee the settlement 
of transactions. To fulfil this role, the CCP has to maintain financial resources 
which, in the event of the clearing member’s default, are sufficient to cover the 
arising losses. For this purpose, the CCP operates a guarantee system, one el-
ement of this is the clearing members’ contributions to the default fund. Our 
study focuses on the structure of the default fund operated by the CCP, as well 
as the stress test used for the calculation of the size of it. The results point out 
that we cannot rely solely on historical data when calculating the default fund. 
It is evident that excluding the outlier results, which are so-called “extreme but 
plausible,” and building the default fund exclusively on historical data could be 
misleading, and the system could suffer unexpected and significant losses. Based 
on the risk mentioned above, hypothetical scenarios must be considered in the 
course of calculation so that the CCP can be prepared for unexpected losses.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The economic crisis of 2008 exposed the vulnerability of the financial system, 
drawing attention to the urgent need to increase the stability of the financial sys-
tem. Directing the clearing of OTC (over-the-counter) derivatives under the cen-
tral counterparties (CCPs) is one of the key points of the regulatory background. 
The clearing activity of the central counterparty means that, in the course of trad-
ing, it takes over the counterparty risk of the clients by becoming each seller’s 
buyer and each buyer’s seller during the transactions. Accordingly, if any of the 
partners fails to perform, the CCP guarantees the completion of the transaction 
for the non-defaulting member. To cover the losses arising from the default of one 
or more clearing members, the CCP has to provide sufficient financial resources, 
which is executed by operating the guarantee system. This system has three im-
portant elements: the initial margin or margin; the so-called skin-in-the-game, 
which refers to the equity of the CCP allocated for this purpose; and the com-
mon default fund. The default fund can be considered to be common, because the 
contribution of the non-defaulting members to the default fund can be used for 
covering losses (Murphy, 2017), while, in the case of the initial margin, it cannot.
Our study focuses on the calculation method of the default fund, exclusively con-
sidering the results of stress tests. The various methodologies of the calculation 
of the default fund were comprehensively compared by Deák (2019), taking into 
account the specialties of the Hungarian market. The strong market position of 
CCPs, which is backed up by several studies, is inarguable (Markose et al., 2012; 
Cont, 2017). Such market infrastructures reduce counterparty risk and can resist 
even under “extreme but plausible” market circumstances, therefore the size of 
the default fund is usually determined employing calculations based on stress 
tests. At the same time, the default of the central counterparty itself may pose a 
system-level risk, which might weaken the resilience of the economy or even lead 
to economic collapse, which would have a dramatic effect on financial stability 
(Duffie et al., 2015).
The study has the following structure: in the second part, the regulatory back-
ground and the findings of previous research are presented. The third part pro-
vides a deeper insight into the applied model. The following fourth part is dedi-
cated to the description and interpretation of our findings, and then the fifth part 
contains the conclusion of the study.
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2 LITERATURE
2.1 Central clearing
Due to a process called novation, the contractual obligation between the trad-
ing parties can be substituted by two equivalent positions between the original 
trading parties and the clearinghouse (Capponi et al., 2018). As a result, the CCP 
becomes each seller’s buyer and each buyer’s seller (KELER KSZF, 2019).
Substituting certain bilateral transactions by multilateral netting, central clear-
ing can reduce the clients’ exposures and isolate the participating partners (clear-
ing members) regarding each other’s default, thus preventing the domino effect 
among market participants (Cont, 2017). 
Figure 1 illustrates the interdependence of exposures and their effect in the case 
of contingent default. In addition, it also shows how the existence of the clear-
inghouse transforms the exposures and the interdependence of the partners. For 
example, supposing that participant “A” cannot pay 100 units to participant “B,” 
“B” will not be able to pay to “D,” and so on. If the CCP appears between the par-
ticipants, on the one hand, it decreases the members’ exposures by netting their 
positions (e.g., participant “B” receives 50 units instead of expecting 100 units 
and paying 50 units), on the other hand, the CCP eliminates counterparty risks 
besides guaranteeing the settlement of centralised exposures.
Figure 1
Bilateral and multilateral netting
Source: Cont, 2017
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2.2 Regulatory background
Risk sharing is a vital point of the central counterparty’s strategy. Several re-
searchers have dealt with this topic (e.g., Murphy et al., 2016). Research shows 
that the risk management of banks and the central counterparties tends to influ-
ence the risk of the financial system. Armenti et al. (2018) also point out that as 
a result of their loss, central counterparties also affect the financial system. Biais 
et al. (2012) explain the risk-sharing effects of the central clearing activity and 
examine the arising moral hazard problems. Based on this, it is confirmed that 
central counterparties do not provide a full guarantee against credit risk. In their 
article published in 2016, they prove that with central clearing, guarantee require-
ments can keep risk prevention incentives by promoting the optimal level of risk 
monitoring and exploiting the mutual benefits of risk-sharing.
Many researchers draw attention to the risk posed by the central counterparties, 
as they are expanding and increasingly becoming integral parts of our everyday 
life. They are criticised for growing too big and may be classified as “too-big-
to-fail” (Cont, 2015, Berlinger et al., 2018). Markose (2012) introduced the term 
“too-interconnected-to-fail,” which means that they become dangerous due to 
excessive interconnection.
The authorities paid particular attention to strengthening the global framework 
of central clearing. As a result, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consum-
er Protection Act was published in the United States of America in 2010, regulat-
ing, inter alia, the operation of CCPs. In Europe, the EMIR (European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation) came into effect in 2012. Even though the EMIR pri-
marily applies to the CCPs of the European Union, several CCPs outside Europe, 
such as ICE Clear Canada, hold an EMIR license, as well (ESMA, 2019b). Our 
study focuses on the European regulation; therefore, we present the requirements 
regarding the risk management of CCPs based on the EMIR.
Article 48 of the EMIR details the fundamental obligations of the central counter-
party regarding the default management. The elements of the guarantee system 
are guarantees available to the central counterparty, which can be liquid assets 
pursuant to Article 46 of the EMIR. In the case of default(s), these guarantees can 
be applied in the order prescribed by Article 45 of the EMIR. Figure 2 represents 
the elements of the guarantee system, the so-called “default waterfall” (Article 4 
of the EMIR):
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Figure 2
The order of the application of the elements of the guarantee system
Source: own editing
When covering losses, the primary sources available are the initial margin and 
all the free guarantees of the defaulting member (e.g., in the case of KELER CCP, 
the basic financial collateral that the clearing members have to pay before enter-
ing the market to be able to start trading (KELER CCP, 2019b). In order to limit 
credit risk, the CCP not only determines and manages the initial margins for the 
clearing members but also collects them. As Figure 2 shows, the CCP is entitled 
to use only the initial margins of defaulting parties to cover losses, but it does not 
have the right to use those of non-defaulting members. The initial margin aims to 
cover losses under normal market conditions. Under Article 41 of the EMIR and 
Chapter VI of the regulatory technical standards (RTS, 2013), the initial margins 
shall be sufficient to cover potential losses estimated by the CCP by the liquida-
tion date of the positions. As stock exchange transactions are executed in T + 2 
days, the liquidation period is two days. This should be enough to cover the losses 
of at least 99% of the exposures, including the stressed period estimated based on 
the retrospective period of 250 days. The regulator does not define this stressed 
period. The central counterparty shall monitor the coverage level regularly and 
review it if required to ensure that it reflects current market conditions, taking 
into account possible procyclical effects in the course of reviews. (Article 41 [1] of 
the EMIR, 2012). Among others, Berlinger et al. (2018; 2019) paid more attention 
to the methods of dealing with procyclicality.
The second available level consists of the default fund contributions by the clear-
ing members. Such contributions aim to enable the CCP to cover those losses that 
were not covered by the initial margin. CCPs tend to grasp these market events 
through stress tests, by applying historical scenarios (a period in the past char-
acterised by significant volatility) and hypothetical (potential future) scenarios. 
Default fund contribution of the non-defaulting members
Dedicated own resources of the CCP
Default fund contribution of the defaulting member(s)
Initial margin of defaulting member(s)
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As Figure 2 indicates, the default fund also provides cross-guarantee between the 
parties (clearing members). However, the non-defaulting parties’ default fund 
contribution can be applied by the CCP on the fourth level. The size of the default 
fund is determined by the max (1;2+3) principle. Based on this, the default fund 
should be sufficient to manage the default of the clearing member that has the 
largest exposure or that of the clearing members with the second and third larg-
est exposures, even under extreme but plausible market conditions, if the total 
exposure of the latter two is larger. Payments to the default fund are proportion-
ate to the exposures of the individual clearing members (Article 42 of the EMIR, 
Chapter VII of the RTS).
If the two sources mentioned above of the defaulting party are entirely exhaust-
ed, the use of the CCP’s dedicated own resources, i.e., the junior tranch, takes 
precedence over the default fund contributions of non-defaulting members in the 
structure of the guarantee system. Therefore, the mutual sharing of losses and 
the default fund contributions by non-defaulting members are used only after the 
CCP’s own funds (Markose et al., 2017). If all of these sources have run out and 
additional sources are needed, the next step is the senior tranch, the CCP’s other 
financial resources. It is not included in Figure 2, because the law does not require 
it, but appears in the practice of some CCPs, such as KELER CCP (KELER CCP, 
2019c). Should those mentioned above, other financial resources not be enough, 
the recovery and resolution tools should be used (Cont, 2015).
In addition to the structure of the guarantee system, the EMIR also prescribes 
that, in order to fulfil its role, the central counterparty shall maintain liquid 
sources which can absorb potentially arising losses in the event of default by the 
two clearing members with the largest exposures. In other words, the four levels 
in Figure 2 shall meet this criterion. The provision above is known in the literature 
as the “Cover 2” rule. 
Our study focuses on the examination of the default funds and the fact of cross-
guarantee between the clearing members, which can be calculated using stress 
tests. The use of the method is justified by the fact that the default fund is linked 
to the result of the stress tests in the risk management system of several central 
counterparties (KELER CCP, 2019a). The stress tests are developed and the size of 
the default fund is calculated according to the above-mentioned Article 49 of the 
EMIR and its regulatory technical standards, taking into account the manage-
ment of the default by the clearing members with the largest exposures.
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2.3 Stress tests 
Stress tests are techniques to measure the effects of events causing rare but sig-
nificant losses that are immeasurable by traditional tools on financial institutions 
(Madar, 2010). Typically, institutions and regulators define independent event 
systems, outline the changes in risk factors, then calculate the amount of losses 
suffered through various scenarios. The accurate process of the preparation of 
stress tests is detailed by Hilbers and Jones (2004). Such tests have two purposes: 
on the one hand, to ensure that the appropriate sources are available at the level of 
the individual institutions, on the other hand, which is even more critical, to en-
able the identification of system-level risks in financial markets. Stress tests have 
several types according to the following classification principles: 
1) complexity: sensitivity analysis or scenario building (BCBS, 2009a), 
2) source of scenarios: historical or hypothetical (Hull, 2015), 
3) number of considered risks: one or more risk factors (Banai et al. 2013), 
4) number of the examined assets, 
5) time horizon of the examination: analysis of a few days or even several years, 
6) bottom-up or top-down analysis (DNB, 2017; MNB, 2016), 
7) analysis of individual institutions or the entire financial system (Cihák, 2007). 
2.3.1 Literature on stress tests
As central counterparties were gradually expanding and becoming one of the pil-
lars of the financial system, they opened a new field for researchers, as well. The 
regulatory framework may be vague in many respects; therefore, several stud-
ies aim to expand knowledge in order to find the most appropriately applicable 
methods and models for CCPs and regulators. Numerous models have been de-
veloped to define the appropriate methodology of stress testing.
Canabarro (2013) focuses on the execution of company-specific stress tests and 
the planning of stress test scenarios. The study concentrates on the macroeco-
nomic, market, credit, partner, and operational risks. The interconnection of fi-
nancial markets was also analysed by Battiston and al. (2016), as well as by Iori 
et al. (2006). They proved that the effect of a potentially adverse event spreads 
among financial institutions through the ownership of common assets, by direct 
and indirect exposures. 
Poce et al. (2018) studied the adequacy of the default fund in terms of the stress 
test in a network framework. The network of the clearing members was analysed 
based on their bond market concentration, considering direct exposures to each 
other. Their main finding was that the calculation of the size of the default fund 
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for covering insolvency was not prudent enough only when the default of the 
two largest clearing members was taken into account, and only very conservative 
default funds, which cover the exposure of several clearing members, are suitable 
for restraining the spill-over effect of the stress. 
Capponi et al. (2018) developed a central clearing model, and they proved that 
the current standard for collecting the default funds - the rule of members with 
the largest exposure - was basically vulnerable. In their model, they demonstrate 
that, instead of covering the default by a specific number of members, the clear-
inghouse should use the entire default fund contribution to cover the specific part 
of the arising losses. The currently effective coverage standards are proved to be 
optimal only in the case of sufficiently high default funds and marginal alterna-
tive costs. Otherwise, if costs are low, the rule is not strict enough, as it results in 
excessive risk-taking by the clearing members.
Paddrik and Young (2017) studied that the simultaneous default of two members 
can contaminate the network and further lead to insufficient funds at the central 
counterparty. Menkveld (2017) pointed out that crowded trading carried out by 
dealers may strengthen the losses of central counterparties in stressed scenarios. 
According to Campbell and Ivanov (2016), losses may be more severe if the expo-
sures of large clearing members correlate positively than if they were independent.
Ghamami and Glasserman (2017) found that the requirements of lower default 
funds reduce clearing costs. However, they are less flexible for central counterpar-
ties. Barker et al. (2016) analysed the use of default funds, the financing liquid-
ity requirements of the individual clearing members, and the negative effect of 
market turbulences on the clearing members. According to their main finding, 
liquidity is the most important element regarding risks and costs.
2.3.2 EU-level stress tests
Both banks and CCPs can be considered systematically important financial in-
stitutions, therefore regulatory authorities conduct regular EU-wide stress tests 
in case of both institution types. Regarding the comparison of stress tests, the 
“specialties” of CCPs are important in comparison with banks, which, according 
to Berlinger et al. (2016) affect their risk management models: 
1) high-level specialisation, 
2) symmetric exposures, 
3) balanced position, 
4) cross-guarantee system, 
5) deposit dependency, 
6) dynamic risk management.
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One of the objectives of EMIR is to promote central clearing and ensure the safe 
and stable operation of CCPs. In the case of central counterparties, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) initiates and coordinates stress tests all 
over the EU. The latest was published in February 2019 (ESMA, 2019). In coopera-
tion with local authorities, ESMA applies common methodologies for the assess-
ment of the effect of different stress scenarios and identifies the shortcomings in 
the resilience of the institutions.
In the course of the tests, they pay special attention to credit-, liquidity- and 
concentration risk, as well as reverse credit tests. The latest results published 
by ESMA in 2017 show that the performance of the central counterparties had 
improved since the first test. According to their communication, ESMA is still 
committed to the further improvement and development of the methodology and 
scope of the CCPs’ stress tests in future practices. (ESMA, 2018).
Hereunder, we present our model, which includes the method used for setting 
the margin requirements, the applied stress test and the methodology of price 
modeling.
3 METHODOLOGY
Our model has the following structure. We have one CCP that clears on the spot 
and the derivatives markets. Two financial instruments are available: a stock and 
a currency. On the spot market, only stocks can be traded, while on the deriva-
tives market, both call and put options and futures contracts are available for 
both financial assets. The strike price and maturity date of derivatives are the 
same for all types. In the case of the two markets, the margin and the size of the 
default fund are calculated separately through the simulations.
The logreturn of the two available instruments follows arithmetic Brownian mo-
tion (ABM):
 (1)
where dY represents the change in the logreturn over a period of time (dt), is the 
expected value of the logreturn, σ is the standard deviation of the logreturn and 
N(0,1) is a standard normal random variable.
The price is calculated as follows:
 (2)
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where t represents time, while S indicates the price of the instrument. By this 
method, we simulate the prices for 7500 days, namely 30 years, in accordance with 
the regulation in the EMIR, in which the Technical Standard prescribes the run-
ning of stress scenarios for the past 30 years (RTS, Article 30).
We also assume that the prices of the two financial instruments are correlated. 
This supposition is incorporated into the model by the Cholesky decomposition. 
The connection between random variables is described by the following relation-
ship, in which  is a random number from the ABM of the currency ρ and is the 
correlation between the logreturn of the stock and the currency:
 (3)
We also simulate stresses in the time series of the instruments. The appearance of 
shocks follows a Poisson process, while the size of shocks is modeled with lognor-
mal distribution. The parameters of the model is summarised in Table 1.
Table 1
Parameters of price simulation
Stock Currency
The parameters of the arithmetic Brownian motion
α 10% 5%
σ 15% 10%
S0 EUR 1000 EUR 1000
dt 1 day 1 day
Parameters affecting the shock value
µ –20 –20.6
standard deviation 0.7 0.8
petering out of the shock 0.97 0.99
Parameters affecting the time of the shock
λ 0.005 0.0045
Source: own editing
In case of a shock, the correlation increases to 0.9, and its value is decreased by 5% 
every day – keeping the minimum value of correlation at the level of 0.5.
Figure 3 shows one realisation of the simulations of the stock price and the shocks 
respectively:
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Figure 3
A realisation of the stock and currency prices and a realisation of the shocks
Source: own editing
On the market, there are four clearing members with different positions. Accord-
ing to our definition, considering their opposite directions, they net each other to 
zero on the whole. Table 2 summarises their positions.
Table 2
Position of clearing members
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We calculated the margin of the underlying products with the method of Béli 
and Váradi (2016), while we applied the SPAN (Standard Portfolio Analysis of 
Risk) system for calculating the portfolio-level margin, whose operation is sum-
marised in Figure 4. In our model, we calculate only with the risk array and the 
short option minimum (SOM), which amounts to 10% of the margin value of the 
underlying product.
Figure 4
The elements of the SPAN margin
Source: Balázs, 2014, based on the CME SPAN, according to the terminology used by KELER CCP
Concerning the portfolio, risk array includes the scenarios summarised in Ta-
ble 3, where regarding price change, one unit refers to the value of the current 
margin, i.e., the prices have to be moved by 1/3, 2/3, 3/3, 6/3 of the margin in the 
individual scenarios. Volatility change was supposed to be 90%, i.e., the value of 
the current standard deviation is increased or decreased by 90% according to the 
signs indicated in the individual scenarios. Based on this, positions are revalued 
according to the new prices of underlying products and new standard deviations. 
The margin of the portfolios of the individual clearing members is be calculated 
based on the scenario with the biggest loss. Balázs (2014) expounds the operation 
of SPAN in a more detailed manner.
e highest
value gives
the SPAN
risk
requirement
Risk array
Inter-month (or intra-
commodity) spread
Spot (delivery) 
month charge
Inter-commodity
spread credit
Short option
minimum (SOM)
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Table 3
Parameters of SPAN scenarios
Scenario Price change Volatility change
1 0.00 1
2 0.00 –1
3 0.33 1
4 0.33 –1
5 –0.33 1
6 –0.33 –1
7 0.67 1
8 0.67 –1
9 –0.67 1
10 –0.67 –1
11 1.00 1
12 1.00 –1
13 –1.00 1
14 –1.00 –1
15 2.00 0
16 –2.00 0
Source: Balázs, 2014
In order to calculate the size of the default fund, we have to run stress tests. We 
apply six different stress scenarios, and, in the case of each clearing member, we 
calculate whether, in the event of default, their margin is enough to cover their 
losses arising from price change or not on the 7500th day of running. We chose 
the 7500th day, as the EMIR prescribes that stress tests have to encompass a pe-
riod of 30 years. In accordance with the regulation in the EMIR, the size of the 
default fund is determined by the scenario, which shows the highest loss of the 
max(1;2+3) exposures. Parameters of the stress scenarios:
 − 4 historical scenarios
1 & 2: Min/max stock: the lowest/the highest return on stock over the period of 
7500 days and the return on the currency on the appropriate days;
3 & 4: Min/max currency: the lowest/the highest return on currency over a 
period of 7500 days and the return on stock on the appropriate day.
 − 2 hypothetical scenarios
1: stock 5%, currency –5%;
2: stock -5%, currency 5%.
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As a final step, the division of the default fund (DF) among clearing members 
(CM) is proportionate to their margin payments:
 (4)
4 ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
The simulation has been run 101 times. Figure 5 shows the sizes of the default 
funds, displaying all the 101 realisations. 
Figure 5
Size of the default fund
Source: own editing
On the whole, it can be stated that the average size of default funds is 7 385.39. 
However, based on the figure illustrating the 101 events of running, it is striking 
that even five extraordinary, outlier events appear. In the case of outlier events, 
the size of the default fund exceeds 20 000, more than the double of the average 
size. Figure 6 represents the funds following the removal of outliers from our data 
series. This figure still shows great differences between default fund sizes. How-
ever, these differences are not so radical than those in Figure 5.
Realizations
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Figure 6
Size of the default fund following the cleaning of the data series
Source: own editing
The total and the cleaned data series can be compared quantitatively as well as 
qualitatively.
Table 4
Comparison of the results of the total and cleaned data series
Total result Cleaned result Total/Cleaned
Minimum   342.40   342.40 1000
Maximum 104 670.14 18 209.94 5748
Average   7 385.39  4 931.37 1498
Standard deviation  12 768.63  4 369.44 2922
Source: own editing
As the only difference between the two data series is the removal of outliers, so 
the minimum value of the default funds is the same in both cases. Based on the 
minimum, it can be stated that its value was never zero, i.e., in all simulated cases, 
the defaulting members’ margin was not enough to cover the losses. Our results 
do not reveal what percentage of this constitutes the default fund contribution 
of the defaulting party and what percentage is attributable to the non-defaulting 
parties. It will be subject to further research. 
At the same time, the maximum shows huge differences between the whole sim-
ulation and the database containing the cleaned results. The maximum of the 
outlier values (104 670.14) is almost six times higher than the maximum of the 
Realizations
EU
R
 
mELINdA FRIESz – KIRA mURATOV-SzAbó – ANdREA PREPUK – KATA VáRAdI214
cleaned data series (18 209.94). The average follows a similar pattern: the average 
of the 101 events of the raw data series is 7 385.39, which is almost one and a half 
times higher than the average of the cleaned data series. Standard deviation be-
haves as a kind of uncertainty indicator, therefore it is a fundamental character-
istic of our results. Based on Table 4, it is observable that the standard deviation 
of the entire data series (12 768.63) is almost three times higher than that of the 
cleaned data series (4 369.44).
In the light of the information above, it is understandable that disregarding outli-
ers, extreme but plausible scenarios and calculating the size of the default fund 
solely based on historical data can be misleading, and the system may face un-
expected, but significant losses. Alfaro and Drehmann (2009) emphasise the im-
portance of stress tests, arguing that their use enables the detection of currently 
identified risks, excluding possible past effects. At the same time, they also con-
firm the importance of past benchmarks. However, they prove that the historical 
perspective is not always sufficient. On the other hand, they believe that, in the 
period before the crisis, a hypothetical stress scenario of 300 basis points would 
not have passed the credibility test. Cont (2015) stresses the significance of the ap-
plication of hypothetical scenarios, as they help the CCP to prepare for extreme 
but plausible losses.
The structure of the whole guarantee system should be subject to further research. 
It would worth examining the actual data in an international context, as well. 
5 CONCLUSION
Following the presentation of the regulatory framework, we described the oper-
ating principles and assumptions of our model. The margin requirements were 
calculated employing the methodology proposed by Béli and Váradi (2016) and 
the SPAN system, while the size of the default fund was determined in accordance 
with Article 42 of the EMIR. Our results revealed how different the sizes of de-
fault funds could be depending on realisations, which proves that it is not enough 
to rely solely on historical data when planning risk management. In our view, the 
calculation should consider hypothetical, extreme, but plausible scenarios so that 
the central counterparty can prepare for unexpected losses.
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